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This article is an interpretation of John Hick’s philosophy of religious pluralism in the 
context of traditional Yoruba religion. The ultimate goal of the article is pragmatic, 
viz. to provide a theoretical basis for peaceful coexist nce among different religions in 
Nigeria. The methods adopted to achieve this objectiv  are hermeneutical/analytical 
and comparative. Hick’s theory is interpreted and aalysed before it is applied to 
traditional Yoruba theology. His concept of the Transcendent or Ultimate Reality is 
equated with the Yoruba concept of the Supreme Being or Olodumare. Both Hickean 
Ultimate Reality and Olodumare are conceived as transc tegorial. However, Yoruba 
divinities are equated with Hick’s personae and impersonae of the Real: like the 
personae and impersonae of Hickean Ultimate Reality, the divinities are 
manifestations of Olodumare. This interpretative method can be used to account for 
differences in the conceptions of the Supreme Being among competing religions in 
Nigeria, especially Islam and Christianity in their conceptions of God. 
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Introduction 
The role of religions in many of today’s conflicts has galvanized scholars of religion 
to find a way of interpreting the apparent conflicting truth claims of various religions 
that lead to mistrust. Many hypotheses have been suggested to reconcile these 
conflicting truth claims. John Harwood Hick’s philosophy of religious pluralism is 
one of such hypotheses (Hick 1989). 
 
Hick reinterpreted what he considered to be one of the most important beliefs in the 
major religions of the world - the affirmation of Ultimate Reality - so as to reconcile 
the two main notions (personal/impersonal) as perceptions of the same Reality. Hick’s 
pluralistic hypothesis belongs to a type of religious pluralism called ‘identist’ 
pluralism, as compared with ‘complementary’/‘deep’/‘differential’ religious 
pluralism. Identist pluralists, such as John Hick (Hick 1989), Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
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(Smith 1967, 55) and Paul Knitter (Knitter 1985, 184) see different religions as 
identical, though with apparently different conceptions and interpretations. 
Differential/complementary pluralists such as John B. Cobb Jr. (Cobb, Jr. 1975, 46) 
and David Ray Griffin (Griffin 2005, 67) recognise that the Ultimate Realities 
perceived by the religions may be different and each of the Realities may be unique. 
On the surface, the conceptions of the Realities may even be contradictory, but as 
Whitehead, the process philosopher who inspired identist pluralists said, “A clash of 
doctrine is not a disaster - it is an opportunity” (Whitehead 1964, 266). This suggests 
that the apparent contradictions could become comple entary. Therefore 
‘differential’ pluralists are “pluralistic soteriolgically and perhaps also ontologically” 
(Griffin 2005, 24). Anything that is ‘soteriological’ has to do with ‘salvation’, that is, 
how the individual or society can be delivered from current problems. Hence to say 
that differential pluralists are pluralistic soteriologically is to say that they affirm 
many ways through which the individual or society can be saved. 
 
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis has generated a wide variety of reactions among 
philosophers of religion and theologians worldwide. Both his critics and admirers 
acknowledged the plausibility of his suggestion, but with some objections. Hick 
developed his hypothesis in the Western context, but with the possible application to 
the world at large. Thus there have been attempts to critically apply his insights in 
different parts of the world. The present article makes such an attempt in the 
traditional Yoruba context. Although the ultimate pur ose of this endeavour is 
pragmatic - to provide a theoretical basis for peaceful coexistence among different 
religions - the immediate aim of this article is theoretical. It is a conceptual 
interpretation of Hick’s pluralistic theory in the traditional Yoruba context. 
 
In the following (second) section, Hick’s theory is presented. Since Hick’s theory is 
primarily concerned with the Ultimate Reality in the religions, a correspondent belief 
in Yoruba Traditional Religion is presented in the third section. An explicit 
interpretation of Hick’s theory of pluralism in the Yoruba traditional context is made 
in the fourth section. The fifth section is the conlusion. 
 
Religious pluralism should be conceptually differentiated from religious plurality and 
religious relativism. Religious plurality refers to“the fact of difference” (Archard 
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1996, 1) or “the empirical reality of diverse religious systems in the world” (Demarest 
1991, 135). David Tracy distinguishes the two thus: “Plurality is a fact. Pluralism is 
one of the many possible evaluations of that fact” (Tracy 1987, 2). Religious 
pluralism should also be distinguished from religious relativism. The latter is “the 
claim that no religious belief is absolutely true” (O’Keeffe 1996, 62). 
 
According to David Ray Griffin, those who accept religious pluralism accept two 
affirmations, a negative one and a positive one. The negative affirmation is the 
rejection of religious absolutism, which means rejecting the a priori assumption that 
one’s own religion is the only one that provides saving truths and values to its 
adherents, that it alone is divinely inspired, that it has been divinely established as the 
only legitimate religion, intended to replace all others. The positive affirmation, which 
goes beyond the negative one, is the acceptance of the idea that there are indeed 
religions other than one’s own that provide saving truths and values to their adherents 
(Griffin 2005, 3). 
 
John Hick’s Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: An Exposition 
The major religions under consideration in John Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis are what 
he calls ‘post-axial’ religions. These include Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism 
and Buddhism. Chinese religions, and ‘primal religions’, to which African Traditional 
Religion belongs, were less considered. The selection was probably due not just to 
what Hick considered as the importance of the ‘World Major Religions’/‘post-axial 
faiths’, but also the environment in which John Hick worked at Birmingham, United 
Kingdom and Claremont, California, U.S.A. where thehypothesis was developed. 
 
Hick’s concept of religious pluralism mainly focuses on the idea of the transcendent 
in the religions. This is not because belief in transcendence is the essence of religion, 
for Hick does not believe there is such essence (Hick 1989, 3 ff.). The reason for his 
focus on the transcendent is that in modern philosophical discussions in the West, it is 
a vital religious question, whether this belief has any significance for religion or not 
(Hick 1989, 6). However, Hick is convinced that this belief is very significant for any 
religion today, so that by focusing on it, it would help him to address “the most 
momentous and the most contested issue in religious discourse today” (Hick 1989, 6). 
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Hick’s discussion of the transcendent concentrates on the traditional distinction in 
post-axial religions, between God’s essential nature and God in relation to the 
creatures. However, because the idea of ‘God’ connotes theism, Hick prefers the 
terms ‘Real’, ‘Absolute’ or ‘the Transcendent’. Using the Kantian epistemological 
distinction between a thing as it is in itself or noumenon and a thing as it appears in 
consciousness or phenomenon, Hick refers to the Real in its essential nature as the 
noumenon or Real an Sich, and the Real as humanly experienced as the phenomena. 
Because the Real n Sich is ineffable, not much can be said about it. In the words of 
Hick: 
… it [the Real an Sich] cannot be said to be one or many, person or 
thing, conscious or unconscious, purposive or non-purposive, 
substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating. None of the 
descriptive terms that apply within the realm of human experience can 
apply literally to the unexperienceable reality that underlies that realm 
(Hick 1989, 350). 
 
However, Hick suggests that in its phenomenal manifestations, the Real is basically 
experienced in one of two ways, namely, a personal r impersonal way (Hick 1990, 
118). This is the reason he adopts a neutral term - the ‘Real’. He also adopts it because 
he sees it as having equivalence in various traditions, such as Al Haqq in Islam, the 
Self-existent Reality in Christianity, Sat/Satyam in Hinduism, and Dharmakaya or 
Śūnyatātattva in Buddhism (Hick 1989, 10 ff.). 
 
Hick’s concept of religious pluralism can be explained in five steps. First, every 
human knowledge of the Real has two sources: from the Ultimate Reality itself, which 
is beyond comprehension and language, and from the culture in which the experiencer 
finds himself or herself. The second step is a logical deduction from the first one: it 
entails the recognition that every conception of the Real is culture-coloured. Hick uses 
Kant’s philosophy especially, but also modern psychology and sociology of 
knowledge to explain this. His contention here is that all revelation or manifestation 
of the Real is experienced, conceived, accepted and interpreted in a cultural context 
and from a cultural perspective. Third, the fact that the conception of the Real by 
every religious tradition is culture-coloured accounts for the diversity in the religious 
conceptions of the Real. For instance, people who till the ground usually conceive of 
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the Real as female, since they depend on the land which bears from its ‘womb’ good 
things for them, while people engaged in livestock keeping usually conceive the Real 
as male, since that occupation requires masculine chara teristics such as courage, 
independence and assertiveness. Fourth, from steps one to three, we can infer that no 
religion could claim to be exclusively true, since each is formed at the interface of the 
ineffable Real and the culture from which the particular religion arises. However, the 
fifth step involves the claim that we can affirm that religions are not illusions but true, 
since they reflect the Real in different ways to every culture, albeit imperfectly (Hick 
1989, 206). 
 
In the five steps outlined above, Hick, in Kantian terms, distinguishes the Real in its 
unperceived sense (the noumenon) from the Real as perceived by each religious 
tradition (the phenomena). Hick claims that this distinction is neither an in ovation of 
his nor an imposition on the religions from Kantian philosophy. He gives evidence of 
the distinction from the major world traditions (Hick 1989, 236 ff.; 1990, 117). For 
instance, in Hinduism, the distinction is made between nirguna Brahman (the 
Brahman without attributes and beyond human language) and saguna Brahman (the 
Brahman with attributes, known in human religious experienc  as Ishvara, the 
personal creator and governor of the universe). Similarly, in Buddhism, there is the 
distinction between dharamata dharmakaya (the Ultimate dharmakaya) and the 
upaya dharmakaya (the Dharma known as the personal Amida, the Buddha of infinite 
compassion). What is more, the scripture of Taoism, known as Tao Te Ching, makes 
the distinction at its beginning thus: “The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal 
Tao.” In Judaism, the Kabbalist Mystics note the difference between En Soph (the 
absolute divine Reality) and the God of the Bible. In Islam, the distinction is made by 
the Sufi Mystics between Al Haqq (the Real, which is the abyss of the Godhead 
underlying the self-revealing Allah. In traditional Christianity, the distinction is made 
between God a se (in his essential nature) and God pro nobis (in relation to his 
creatures). In like fashion, Meister Eckhart distinguishes between the Godhead 
(Gottheit/deita) and God (Gott/deus) (cited in Mojsischi and Summerrell 2011). Paul 
Tillich also discusses the “God above the God of theism” (Tillich 1980, 190) and 
Gordon Kaufmann talks of “the real God” and the “available God” (Kaufmann 1972, 
86). 
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Traditional Yoruba Theology 
At the beginning of the academic study of Traditional Yorùbá Religion in the 19th 
century by explorers and missionaries, its nature was confusing to them (Peel 2003, 
302). The closest spiritual world to the people that t e Westerner could see in their 
day-to-day lives was that of ‘living-dead’ ancestor. Then there were deities/divinities 
commonly worshipped in rituals, sacrifices, prayers and festivals, among others. The 
worship of ‘God’ was apparently quite uncommon, as there were no temples, 
sacrifices or rituals in his/her honour. If not because of the usual mentioning of ‘God’ 
in ‘native’ talks, the belief would have been deciddly declared non-existent. In fact 
some Western thinkers were even convinced that Africans generally cannot conceive 
God. When the fact on the ground disproved this, different terms were used to 
describe the traditional concept of God, such as ‘the high god’ and ‘the withdrawn 
god’. 
 
The problem became complicated when it was observed that ‘the high god’ receives 
no worship, whereas the divinities (including the spirits encompassed in animism, the 
deified ancestors and other gods) do. The popular names for these divinities are 
Irúnmalè and Òrìsà. The former could be shortened to Imalè. T.F. Jemiriye also 
mentioned Imolè, which may be a variation of Imalè (Jemiriye 1998, 25). E.B. Idowu 
interpreted Imalè as Èèmò tí ñ be nílè (‘The supernormal beings of the earth’), 
suggesting awesomeness, eeriness, the mysterium tremendum and to be contrasted 
with Òrìsà, which he described as “prosaic and homely” (Idowu 1977, 61). In 
English, apart from the term ‘divinities’, these spiritual beings are sometimes referred 
to as gods and spirits. 
 
Oduyoye interpreted the Yorùbá concept of the divinit es as “… patrons, patriarchs, 
principes - who are first hero worshipped and then deified” (Oduyoye 1971, 30). 
However, Oduyoye’s comment indicates a lack of discrimination in the categories of 
the divinities; for it is not true that every divinity is a hero deified. Instead, ‘hero-
divinities’ belong to only one of the three categories of divinities. The three are 
primordial divinities (or divinities from heaven), deified ancestors, and personified 
natural forces/phenomena (Idowu 1973, 172; Awolalu and Dopamu 1979, 73). In the 
first category are the primordial divinities. These had been with God before the 
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creation of the earth, so that their origin is obscure. They include Òbàtálá (Òrìsà-nlá), 
Òrúnmílà, Èsù and Ògún. Awolalu includes Oduduwa among the primordial 
divinities, although he also acknowledges him (her?) as a deified ancestor (Awolalu 
1979, 25). Secondly, there are the deified ancestors such as Sàngó, Òrìsà-Oko and 
Ayélala. These were originally human beings who due to their extra-ordinary or 
mysterious lives had been deified or (to use a Christian theological term) ‘canonised’. 
They have ceased to be ancestors and have absorbed the attributes of divinities. Thus 
were Sàngó and Jàkúta. In the third category are the natural forces and phenomena 
that are personified. In this category are rivers such as Òsun in Oshogbo, mountains 
such as Olosunta in Ikere-Ekiti, Ìyámòpó in Ìgbétì and Àdásóbo in Kishi, the earth, 
lagoons, the sea, trees and wind. 
 
There is no doubt that the divinities are gods, although acknowledged by the Yoruba 
to be less than the Supreme God (Olodumare). Scholars were hesitant to say that the 
divinities were creatures because they (the divinites) share some aspects of the divine 
nature. Idowu, Awolalu and Dopamu would rather say that the divinities ‘emanated’ 
or were ‘engendered’ by Olódùmarè (Idowu 1973, 169; 1977, 62; Awolalu & 
Dopamu 1979, 72). The Yoruba expressions about the origin of the divinities are 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, we should not forget that these are myths, and so would be 
greatly misunderstood if taken literally. We believe the purpose of giving a 
supernatural origin to the divinities is simply to p int out their difference in kind from 
humans. 
 
Is Yorùbá Traditional Religion then monotheism, polytheism, animism or ancestor 
worship, as some other aspects of the religion seem to suggest? Idowu (1973, 165) 
and Awolalu and Dopamu (1979, 16 ff.), three of thegr atest writers on traditional 
Yorùbá religion, use the terms ‘polytheism’ and ‘pluralism’ almost interchangeably, 
although they disagree on whether or not they are applicable to traditional Yorùbá 
religious belief. Awolalu and Dopamu characterize polytheism/pluralism as 
quantitative, to which Idowu disagrees. 
 
Idowu took his meaning of ‘polytheism’ from Paul Tillich who regarded it as “a 
qualitative and not a quantitative concept. It is not a belief in a plurality of gods but 
rather the lack of a unifying and transcending ultimate which determines its character” 
John Hick’s Philosophy of Religious Pluralism in the Context of Traditional Yoruba Religion  93 
 
(Idowu 1973, 166; Tillich 1957, 246). This quotation reveals an apparent 
contradiction when compared with the interpretation of Awolalu and Dopamu for 
whom  polytheism is a quantitative concept. The exist nce of the many divinities led 
Awolalu and Dopamu to infer that Traditional African Religion is in a way 
polytheistic (Awolalu & Dopamu 1979, 17). Idowu explicitly rejects this latter claim 
(Idowu 1973, 168). The second part of Tillich’s statement that polytheism is “the lack 
of a unifying and transcending ultimate which determines its character” led Idowu to 
conclude that African Traditional Religion is monotheistic, although with 
qualification: 
I conclude that the religion can only be adequately described as 
monotheistic. I modify this ‘monotheism’ by the adjective ‘diffused,’ 
because here we have a monotheism in which there exist other powers 
which derive from deity such being and authority that they can be 
treated, for practical purposes almost as end [sic] in themselves (Idowu 
1973, 135). 
 
An Interpretation of Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis in the Yoruba 
Traditional Religious Context 
The thesis of this article is that what Idowu refers to as ‘diffused monotheism’ or 
Olódùmarèism is identical in content and explanation with what Hick means by his 
concept of pluralism. Awolalu and Dopamu are therefor  correct when they state that 
“the Supreme Being is the cohesive, unifying and supernatural ultimate that holds the 
religion together.” This is because the divinities have no “absolute existence” 
(Awolalu & Dopamu 1979, 17). Idowu’s ‘diffused monotheism’ is in no way different 
from the philosophical explanation given of the difference between the Real an Sich 
and its manifestations in Hick. 
 
How do we make the metaphysical distinction between the Real an Sich and its 
manifestations in Yoruba Traditional Religion? The absence of abstract thinking in 
the Yorùbá conceptualisation of the Supreme Being might suggest that the concept 
cannot be identified with the Hickean ultimate Real. The latter is presented in abstract, 
Western philosophical garb, whereas the Yorùbá one is embedded in myths, folktales, 
songs and proverbs, among others. Idowu has suggested that the reason for the 
Yoruba conceptualising the Supreme Being in such a oncrete manner is that they do 
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little abstract thinking (Idowu 1977, 39). I believe Idowu is mistaken in this, but that 
Sogolo is correct in pointing out that the Yorùbá do not conceptualise God in an 
abstract manner because they simply believe that God cannot be fully conceptualised. 
This is illustrated in the kingship system among the Yoruba, where the King (Oba) 
can only be approached indirectly through his chiefs. He continues: “he [God] is by 
his very nature too incomprehensible to the human mind” (Sogolo 1989, 125). Sogolo 
is however mistaken and contradicts his earlier statement when he later asserts that 
“God in African religion, is not transcendental” (Sogolo 1989, 125). It is the 
transcendent character of God that makes him incomprehensible, and this is similar to 
what Hick refers to as the ‘Real’, ‘transcategorial’ or ‘ineffable nature’ (Hick 1989, 
350). 
 
Awolalu illustrates the apparent total transcendency without immanency of God in 
Yorùbá religion through the Yorùbá political set up. He points out that it is the 
‘numinous’ status of the Yorùbá Oba (king) that traditionally prohibits the subjects 
from going directly to him, but rather through his chiefs who act as intermediaries 
(Awolalu 1979, 17 ff.). This statement of Awolalu intentionally alludes to a similar 
interpretation of the religious system of the Yorùbá. The ‘numinous’ character of the 
Supreme Being prevents the Yorùbá from going directly to him, but rather through his 
‘chiefs’ - the divinities. This explains why the divinities appear to receive all worship 
and sacrifices, without much, if any directed to the Supreme Being himself. The use 
of the word ‘numinous’, a cognate of ‘noumenon’, for the Supreme Being supports the 
thesis being proposed in this article: the Supreme Being is numinous (adjective) or the 
noumenon (noun). He is a “Wholly Other” (Awolalu 1979, 50). 
 
In discussing the transcendency of God, Idowu similarly examines the idea of the 
numinous character of the supreme being. With regard to his transcendency he writes: 
He [God] is transcendent; so transcendent is He that the fact of his 
immanence has received little emphasis except, of course, in the 
implicit understanding that He is there all the time, in control of the 
whole course of nature, and available to man, whenev r He is called 
upon (Idowu 1977, 47). 
However, to Idowu, the idea of the ‘holy’ in the sen  of the active, swift, consuming 
‘numinous’ is lacking in the Yorùbá conception of the Deity himself (Idowu 1977, 
47). The concept and the feeling of awe and eeriness that the numinous feeling evokes 
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have been transferred to two divinities, namely, Jàkúta, the thunder divinity and 
Sòpòná, the small pox divinity. 
 
The most important point for us here is that the total transcendency of Olódùmarè, or 
the ‘transcategorial’ nature, to use a Hickean coinage, is undeniable. This is evident in 
three clearly observable facts in Yorùbá religion. First, unlike the divinities, the 
Supreme Being is not represented by graven images or pictorial paintings. There 
might be symbols and emblems associated with him such as a circle, but not images 
or paintings (Awolalu 1979, 14). This is because he is unique and incomparable. 
Second, there are usually no temples dedicated to him, because he is not localised in 
the thought of the people, in spite of them referring to him as Olórun (“the owner of 
heaven”). Third, if we agree with Idowu that the proper name of God in Yorùbá is 
Olódùmarè, just as his proper name as far as the Hebrews were concerned is the 
unpronounceable YHWH, then the meaning of the name Olódùmarè itself conveys 
transcategoriality. As Idowu observes, it means “… One who is supreme, 
superlatively great, incomparable, and unsurpassable in majesty, excellent in 
attributes, stable, unchanging, constant, reliable” (Idowu 1977, 36). 
 
However, there is an obvious objection to the third proposal above. A reading of Hick 
reveals one fact that we do not want to obscure, namely, that all personal gods, 
whether of explicit monotheisms such as Yahweh of the Jews or Allah of the 
Muslims, or polytheism such as there was in the Greek pantheon and the impersonal 
absolutes in Eastern religious thought, are regarded as phenomenal manifestations of 
the Real. This neatly categorises the Yorùbá concept of the Supreme Being as a 
phenomenon (the conception of God in the minds of the worshippers), and not the 
Real an Sich (the concept of God as God is in Godself or the noumenon), as is being 
suggested in this article. We do not want to close our eyes to this clear categorisation. 
Nonetheless, an impersonal concept of the Supreme Being is totally alien to African 
thought. God is thought of as being beyond human conception rather than as being 
impersonal. Impersonality is meaningless in this context. Moreover, as we have seen, 
the comparable concept to the concept of Real an Sich is Olódùmarè. For example, 
Parrinder observes that the myths about Olódùmarè are less anthropomorphic than 
those of divinities (Parrinder 1961, 227). This lends support to our hypothesis of 
seeing Olódùmarè as the Real an Sich. 
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Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Olódùmarè is usually pictured 
anthropomorphically. For instance, in another work, Parrinder observes that as much 
as Africans can conceive God in an abstract manner, th ir myths about him are 
anthropomorphic. He writes: “Wise Old Africans, when questioned on this point of 
the absence of worship, say that God is too great to be contained in a house” 
(Parrinder 1982, 19). He adds: “… in myths, the Supreme Being is spoken of in a 
personal manner as if he were a man with a body, and often with a wife and family” 
(Parrinder 1982, 19). The anthropomorphic picture of Olódùmarè in Yorùbá thought 
is best summed up by Idowu when he writes that the hought of Olódùmarè is 
… of a Personage, venerable and majestic, aged but not aging, with a 
greyness which commands awe and reverence. He speaks; He 
commands; He acts; He rules; He judges; He does all that a person of 
the highest authority, in whose control everything s, will do (Idowu 
1977, 39). 
 
Of course anthropomorphism is not in any way peculiar to either the Yorùbá or 
Africans generally. It is found in most, if not all theistic religions, both monotheistic 
and polytheistic. Even in all the so-called developd religions it is present. As Idowu 
observes, 
Man really finds little satisfaction except in a Deity who lives, who has 
a heart, who speaks, who hears. Centuries of metaphysical thinking 
have not succeeded and may never succeed in curing man of 
anthropomorphism in his private thought about Him. He will ever 
project something of himself into his thought of Him, in order to make 
the Unknown intelligible by analogy from that which is known (Idowu 
1977, 39). 
 
We have another support for our proposal to liken the personae (the conception of 
God as personal) and impersonae (the conception of Ultimate Reality as impersonal) 
to the divinities of the Traditional Yoruba Religion. As the personae and impersonae 
are products of both the Real and human perception, and thus ‘windows’ or ‘images’ 
through which the Real is apprehended, so are the divinities conceived in Yorùbá 
religion. The ‘transcategorial’ or ineffable characteristic of the Real (the noumenon) is 
what makes it imperceptible. Similarly, as Awolalu explained, it is because of the 
Supreme Being’s “wholly otherness” that Africans don t go directly to him, but 
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indirectly through the divinities (Awolalu 1981, 3 ff.); or as he puts it in another 
instance, “They [the divinities] exist for the purpose of bringing the Supreme Being 
closer to his creatures” (Awolalu 1979, 50). The same idea is being expressed when 
the divinities are described as offspring, intermediaries, ministering Spirits, or 
functionaries of the Supreme Being (Awolalu 1979, 50). Idowu expressed the same 
idea when he noted that the divinities are “channels through which man … should 
normally approach Deity” (Idowu 1973, 171). 
 
Another issue that evokes comparison is the ontological status of the divinities: are 
they objectively real, so that we can say of each that “… in addition to the many finite 
centres of consciousness, reason, emotion and will constituting the millions of human 
selves, there is another limitlessly greater such centre of consciousness which is the 
divine self?” (Hick 1989, 269). Answering this question in the affirmative is an 
essential part of religious pluralism. Hick therefor  critically examines such beliefs in 
different religions. The question is: What is the logical implication of believing that 
each persona of the Real is objectively real and with qualities attributed to it? It is 
possible to accept the claim that each of them is ontol gically real and thus end up in 
polytheism. However, there is a logical problem in the plurality of the divinities which 
would affect the ultimacy of the religion. Each of these personae such as YHWH of 
the Jews, Heavenly Father of the Christians, Allah of the Muslims, among others 
claims to be the sole creator or source of the universe. If each of them is accepted to 
be objectively real and different from the other, who among them  
did indeed create the universe, if any of them did? 
  
One option is to accept and interpret each of these p rsonae as different names of one 
divine reality. This has great similarity to what Hick suggests, but it is not identical to 
it. The problem with this second suggestion is thatit is not simply the names of these 
gods that are different, but also the descriptions f the divine personages behind each 
of the names. The logical implication of this is that difference in description points to 
difference in essence. However, it is this conclusion that Hick rejects. He accepts the 
point of the first suggestion that the deities are different. He also accepts the 
apparently contradictory suggestion of the second that he deities are somehow 
identical. The formula he uses to reconcile the seemingly conflicting propositions is 
the essence of his pluralistic hypothesis. The formula is exemplified in an 
interpretation of the relations between the three prsons in the Godhead in the 
Christian idea of the Trinity - the ‘modal’ construal of the trinity (the interpretation of 
the Trinity as manifestations of one divine reality in three forms or modes). According 
to Hick, the formula is also illustrated in the Buddhist trikaya doctrine (Hick 1989, 
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272). The Christian ‘modal’ construal of the trinity understands the concept of person 
in the Trinitarian doctrine. Father, Son and Spirit a e three modes of activities of one 
divine reality. Similarly, in the Buddhist trikaya doctrine, the Ultimate Dharmakaya - 
the Sambhogakaya - and the Nirmanakaya are distinguished. The Ultimate 
Dharmakaya, somehow similar to the Christian theological concept of the Father, is 
the Eternal Truth or Reality of the Buddha nature - “indestructible, timeless, Absolute, 
the one essence in and behind all that was, is and will be … the absolute reality, 
besides which there is no other reality” (Schumann 1973, 272). The counterpart belief 
to the personality of the Son is Sambhogakaya, which consists of a plurality of 
transcendent Buddhas. The Spirit has its counterpart in the Buddhist doctrine of 
Nirmanakaya, which consists of earthly human beings who have attained to final 
enlightenment and thus become vehicles of a transcendent Buddha. 
 
The most important analogy for our understanding of the ontological status of the 
divinities in Yorùbá religion is the Buddhist explication of Sambhogakaya. This is 
supposed to be understood “as mental creations, as ideations of the Bodhisattva” 
(Schumann 1973, 102), that is, the religious. To the religious, “his ideal becomes so 
vivid and alive that it takes shape as a subjective reality” (Schumann 1973, 104-105). 
Hick agrees with this interpretation thus: “[Sambhogakaya] are thus projections of the 
religious imagination” (Hick 1989, 273). Applied tohe gods or personae of the Real 
- Jahweh, the heavenly Father, Allah, Shiva, Vishnu, etc. - it means that these “are not 
objectively existent personal individuals with their own distinctive powers and 
characteristics.; but they are not mere hallucinations either, without any objective 
source. Rather, they are “veridical hallucinations” (Hick 1989, 273). 
 
This treatment of the gods as neither totally non-exist nt nor objectively real as 
conceived by the religions is not different from the way Idowu treats the divinities. He 
indirectly agrees with Richard Garnett in The Twilight of the Gods, in which it is 
cautiously stated that the divine beings (in contrast to the Supreme Being) were 
creations of men’s minds. To support his interpretation, Idowu cites a saying of 
Yorùbá Elders: “Ibití ènìyàn kòsí, kòsí imalè (where there is no man, there is no 
divinity)” (Idowu 1977, 63). However, Idowu notes tha  we should be cautious and so 
not say that the divinities are totally non-existent. To a believer in them, they are real, 
“ … so real that they have in fact been substituted for the Supreme Being in many 
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worships” (Idowu 1977, 63). In other words, like the Buddhist Bodhisattvas, in 
worship, the divinity of an adherent becomes so vivid and alive: his (the believer’s) 
ideas would be encased in the divinity. The divinity thus serves as an inspiration for 
what the believer conceives as the ideal form of exist nce. 
 
We find this phenomenon of religious experience corroborated by Wole Soyinka, an 
adherent of Yorùbá religion who is also a first rate intellectual in the modern world. In 
his own testimony, in an interview with a Nigerian Magazine, he states: 
“Early in life as a child, I found that my temperament, my instinct, my 
spirituality leaned towards Ògún. He is the god of creativity, god of 
iron, a destructive deity, and at the same time, a cre tive deity because 
he is the god of creativity as well. He is the god of lyric, god of the 
song, and the god who like Sàngó believes rigidly in justice, and that is 
why people swear in Ògún’s artefact, metal, and for me justice is a 
crucial principal … He is my personal demiyurge … my elder brother 
and he weaves a kind of protective aura around me … He is a 
metaphor of existence for me” (Soyinka 1999, 29). 
 
Soyinka’s statement that Ògún “is a metaphor of existence for me … a contextual 
metaphor” is not different from what Hick and Idowu are saying. The divinities are 
not objective existents; rather, they are “contextual metaphors”. Judith Glearson 
explains the same experience in relation to Yorùbá divinities thus: “The Orisha [sic] 
are like immense magnifying mirrors, in which we behold ourselves as potentialities. 
To those who believe in them, the Orisha [sic] are guardians through whom one lives 
a more intense life vicariously, guides whose excess of energy leads their devotees to 
a more placid, a more balanced existence” (Glearson 1969, 112-113). Similarly, there 
is no one who knows Sàngó worshippers that would not agree with Benjamin Ray 
when he writes: 
Shango [sic] devotees exhibit a personality that strongly resembl s the 
violent, antisocial and sexually unbalanced characte  of Shango 
himself. A study by Wescott and Morton-Williams shows that many 
devotees have tendencies toward aggression and violence. Others are 
boisterous or highly temperamental. When Shango’s spirit enters his 
priests, they display unusually violent and erratic possession 
behaviour, and appear to be venting aggression impulses (Ray 1976, 
71). 
In other words, just as a Christian imaginatively looks at Christ intensely and 
struggles to be like Him, just as His cross symbolically represents and inspires the 
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Christian that he or she should likewise give himself or herself as a sacrifice for the 
good of humanity (Nabofa 1994, 19), and he or she believes Christ empowers him or 
her through the Holy Spirit to grow in/into his ideals, so does Soyinka and other 
adherents of traditional divinities look at their chosen Òrìsà intensely, and so become 
like him/her. One’s context and psychological make-up contribute to the nature of 
one’s god; and because we have different contexts and psychological make-ups, our 
conceptions differ. 
 
Nonetheless, some conceptions of divinity that are de med to be destructive have to 
be ruled out, thus the need for criteria by which to discriminate between adequate and 
inadequate conceptions of the Real. The benchmark we are suggesting to achieve this 
is the Yorùbá form of the Hickean soteriological and ethical criteria. This is not 
strange to the Yoruba, as they generally accept that “ Ìwà l’èsìn (religiosity is shown in 
personal quality)”. Ìwà (character) is the highest ethical demand of Yoruba religion. 
Idowu points out that Ìwà signifies two things: ‘being’ and ‘correct personal ethos and 
approved moral issues’. To signify these two apparently different ideas, the word Ìwà 
in Yoruba is pronounced and spelt alike. Idowu correctly observes that this is not 
accidental but rather intentional: “To the Yoruba, the nature of a person’s essential 
being determines the moral issue of life, so that it is unmistakably implied in Yoruba 
theology that ‘being’ and correct chemistry of being with regard to personal 
integration and moral attributes are so correlated that they can be regarded as 
synonymous” (Idowu 1971, 89). 
 
Wande Abimbola corroborated the traditional Yoruba view that good character is 
essential to religiosity when he pointed out that Ìwà is from the verbal root wà (to be, 
to exist) “by the addition of the deverbative prefix ‘i’ ”. The original meaning of Ìwà, 
he interpreted as “the fact of being, living or existing”, citing an Ifá saying that: 
Ire Owó 
Ire Omo 
Ire Àìkú parí Ìwà.  
(The blessedness of money 
The blessedness of children 
The blessedness of longevity 
Are the fruits of character) (Abimbola 1975, 293). 
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Ìwà (character) is then the “very essence of being … the very aims of human 
existence …” (Abimbola 1975, 293-294). Abimbola goes on to point out that to the 
Yorùbá, the essence of religious worship consists of cultivating Ìwàpèlé (good 
character) - thus “Ìwà l’èsìn” (“religiosity is shown in character” or “Ìwà is another 
name for religious devotion”) (Abimbola 1975, 293-294). 
 
Conclusion 
In his conception of religious pluralism, John Hick has suggested that the differences 
between the religions of the world are real, but that these differences should be 
interpreted in the light of Immanuel Kant’s insight. Kant suggested that our perception 
of things is more complex than we think, that is, the data of our perception do not 
accurately reflect objective reality. Instead, events, situations and other similar 
experiences that we perceive are differently selectd, ordered and interpreted to be 
processed in our consciousness, just as we have to unconsciously choose what we are 
conscious of seeing and hearing among the innumerable things surrounding us. The 
implication of this modern epistemology is that it is not possible for us to perceive a 
thing as it is in itself: we have to perceive it in a context, that is, from a position. 
 
Applied to the differences among religions, Hick has postulated that the apparent 
multiplicity of transcendent realities behind the religions could be seen as singular and 
identical, in spite of the differences in conception. Hick applies this interpretation 
especially to the concept of Ultimate Reality in religions. For him, the Ultimate 
Reality as it is in itself, in its essential nature, is distinguished from its phenomenal 
manifestations in different cultural contexts around the world. According to this view, 
it is the same Ultimate Reality that is perceived, albeit at different levels of 
transparency/adequacy to the Real. The criterion for assessing the adequacy of a 
conception of Ultimate Reality is soteriological/ethical, that is, the conception results 
in good character in the lives of the believers. 
 
Using the Hickean interpretative model in the traditional Yoruba context, This article 
has equated Olódùmarè with the Hickean noumenon. However, the concept of 
Olódùmarè is explicitly theistic, that is, it is a notion of the Real as personal. 
Nevertheless, since an impersonal concept of the Ultimate Real is absent in the 
African, and by implication Nigerian context, this is not a problem. The article goes 
on to propose viewing the divinities as phenomena, revealing Olódùmarè - the 
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noumenon. This interpretation is not novel: it is inherent i  traditional Yoruba 
religion, although not logically articulated in the way we have done. 
 
In conclusion, This article suggests that in the contemporary religious scene in 
Nigeria, Christians, Muslims and adherents of African Traditional Religion should see 
themselves as worshipping the same God. ‘God’ is necessarily conceived differently 
due to the diverse contexts of revelation from which the religions come. This is the 
moral of this conceptual exercise. 
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